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Resumen
Este artículo aborda el tema de la política exterior populista en Argen-
tina y emplea una metodología de investigación de múltiples métodos 
que combina el análisis del discurso, el análisis de la política exterior y 
la reconstrucción política histórica del kirchnerismo. Teóricamente, nos 
referimos al populismo como un “enfoque ideacional” y consideramos las 
líneas temáticas de Destradi y Plegaman para investigar el populismo en 
la política mundial. A lo largo del artículo, sostenemos que la política ex-
terior populista de izquierda no discrimina la cooperación internacional 
y la globalización per se, pero en una visión maniquea del mundo, critica 
a los países occidentales ricos y propone la creación de nuevas alianzas 
regionales.
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Abstract
This article addresses the issue of populist foreign policy in Argentina and 
employs a multi-methods research that combines discourse analysis, fore-
ign policy analysis, and historical political reconstruction of Kirchnerism. 
Theoretically, we refer to populism as an “Ideational Approach” and we 
consider Destradi and Plegaman’s thematic lines in order to investigate 
populism in world politics. Throughout the paper, we argue that left-wing 
populist foreign policy does not discriminate against international coope-
ration and globalization per se but in a Manichean vision of the world, it 
criticizes western rich countries, and proposes the creation of new regio-
nal alliances. 
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Latin America has always been seen as a pioneer in the emergence 
of populism —understood either as “post-democracy”(Crouch, 2004) 
or “disfigured democracy” (Urbinati, 2014)—; in a nutshell, as “de-
generation or pathology of democracy” (Anselmi, 2018). Despite it 
has mostly been a Latin American feature, populism became a global 
issue when it appeared in the consolidated democracies of the West, 
especially with the arrival of Donald Trump as president of the USA 
and Boris Johnson as British premier, right after the approval of 
Brexit. Further, the populist phenomenon has also spread in other 
European democracies. For instance, in Italy —with its Northern 
League-Five Star Movement—, in Hungary —with Orban’s political 
rule— and in Poland —with PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Law and 
Justice),— its right-wing populist party. These premises demonstrate 
that populism has become a global phenomenon and it’s here to stay 
(Destradi & Plagemann, 2019). As in Anselmi (Anselmi, 2018, p. 1) 
it is impossible to dissociate reflection on contemporary democracy 
from consideration on the populist phenomenon: “we are witnessing 
a social and political dynamic which started some decades ago, that ap-
pears periodically and is of a global nature, as it manifests itself in very 
different geographical contexts”. 
Thus, as populist movements rise to power, the implications on 
foreign policy and international relations —IR— became more rel-
evant than ever, especially in Latin American countries “where popu-
lists have long held political power and have influenced foreign policy 
in practice” (Chryssogelos, 2017, p. 1). For instance, although early 
studies focused on explaining the emergence, little was said about the 
relationship between populism and foreign policy, or even between 
populism and IR (Destradi & Plagemann). Stengel (Stengel et al., 
2019) asserted that, despite significant attention has been paid to the 
phenomenon, populism world politics remains underexplored, much 
to the detriment of both IR and populism itself. 
Moreover, we make reference to Alan (Burrier, 2019) who did 
a systematic and in-depth analysis comparing foreign policies in 6 
Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Nica-
ragua and El Salvador) during 3 decades and collated countries with 
extended histories of populism (the treatment group) with peer na-
tions where populism has been notably absent (the control group), in 
spite of achieving “a balance between generalizability and depth”, the 
study had two conceptual limitations. The first refers to the definition 
of populism only as a political strategy, which makes it very difficult to 
identify a populist foreign policy. The second was only to work with 
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the classic variables of nationalism and protectionism, thus leaving 
aside —in our view— other variables that are also important for IR 
such as cooperation and conflict.
Furthermore, we consider the work of Daniel (Wajner, 2019) 
who studied the foreign policy of Latin American populist govern-
ments but compared the formulation of the foreign relations of the 
three great populist periods in the region: “classic populism” (1930s-
1950s), “neo-liberal neo-populism” (Mudde), and “progressive 
neo-populism” (2000s). In this case, he compared periods trying to 
respond to “how these regimes conducted their foreign policies on 
the hemispheric, interregional, regional/sub-regional, and global/
trans-national levels”. While expanding the study variables with re-
spect to Burrier, it tells us little or nothing about what it understands 
by populism and how to identify a foreign policy as populist, although 
it does so in a systematic and cohesive way.
In relation to the criticism concerning unclear and not specific 
concept of populism, it should be added that most studies do not try 
to determine whether the foreign policy of a populist government is 
also a populist one. For instance, there is a lack in studies that focus 
on how existing characteristics of populism are elucidating the formu-
lation and application of nation-states’ foreign policies.
Moreover, in their comparative research on Carlos Menem Argen-
tinian foreign policy (1989-1999) —considered a right-wing populist 
government— and the one of Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) in Venezuela 
– classified as left-wing populist leader, Leslie and Cameron (Wehner 
& Thies, 2020, p. 2) argued that “a comparison of two cases of popu-
lisms can shed light on the type of international behaviour they seek to 
advance and discredit the notion that there is only one type of popu-
list foreign policy”. Although the authors did a similar job to the one 
proposed here, they approached the study of foreign policy from the 
perspective of the role-played by populist leaders, mainly, at the inter-
national level. 
For these reasons, the idea of the present work lies in the attempt 
to further develop the study carried out by Sandra and Johannes 
(Destradi & Plagemann, 2019) in the specific case of Argentina. 
Through an analysis of the discourse of the main Argentinian presi-
dential speeches that are about foreign policy and world politics of the 
populist governments of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner 2003-2015, we 
aim at contributing to the analysis of the thematic lines present in the 
literature, but we want to highlight the reasons why we consider that 
their foreign policy was populist.
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Our research aim and method
This paper aims to investigate if the Kirchnerist populist foreign 
policy follows the thematic lines identified by Sandra and Johannes 
(Destradi & Plagemann, 2019): a) More Conflict-Prone Bilateral Re-
lations; b) A weakening of global governance and its institutions; c) 
A more centralized and personalized foreign policymaking; and d) 
the development of a new international partnership (i.e. UNASUR, 
ALBA) while weakening links to traditional western partners. In this 
sense, our main research question is how did the populist foreign pol-
icy under Kirchnerism follow the lines of Destradi and Plagemann? 
How populism comes to determine some of the foreign policy argu-
ments of Kirchnerism? Therefore, to reach our point, we have to de-
terminate first whether and why the Kirchnerism foreign policy was 
populist. 
In order to fulfil our research goal, this article combines discourse 
and foreign policy analysis and historical political reconstruction of 
Kirchnerism (2003-2015) in Argentina. We consider discourse anal-
ysis in order to grasp a corpus of statements which, the presidents 
used as a form of engaging discontinuity over time and space and in 
terms of technology of power (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008; 
Foucault, 1981). Whereas, foreign policy analysis and historical politi-
cal reconstructions serve the aim of adding context and qualitative, 
making sense of the discourses that ultimately led to specific foreign 
policies (Hudson & Day, 2019)
We decided to consider those thematic lines of Sandra and Jo-
hannes (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019) and in this study we argue that 
this model Fig. 1 explains how foreign policy decisions have worked 
during Kirchnerism in Argentina.
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Figure. 1:
Populist Foreign Policy (PFF) in Argentina (2003- 2015): how for-
eign policy works in a left-wing populist regime
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Conceptualizing Populism and Foreign Policy
Populism has been studied and defined in various ways, respond-
ing to different contexts, case studies and the affiliation of the authors 
addressing the phenomenon. However, it is possible to establish a sys-
tematization of the state of art of the contemporary debate used by the 
academic community.
Authors such as Paul (Taggart, 2000); Kurt (Weyland, 2001); Raúl 
(Madrid, 2008); Carlos and Enrique (de la Torre & Peruzzotti, 2008); 
Kenneth (Roberts, 2008); Robert (Barr, 2009); Robert (Jansen, 2011); 
Steven and James (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013), among others, con-
sider populism as a political mobilization, political style or political 
strategy —their conceptual similarities allow to cluster them in the 
same group— that consists of applying redistributive and nationalist 
economic policies (Weyland), of organizing the state structure in a 
personalistic way that derives from the direct exercise of public pow-
er (political style). And, finally, they constantly appeal to the people, 
seeking their political mobilization through the use of patronage net-
works and plebiscites.
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On the other hand, Ernesto (Laclau, 2005); Hawkins (2010); and 
Casullo (Casullo), among others, understand populism as a political 
discourse, that is, a way of saying and presenting things. They use a 
rhetoric that constructs politics in terms of an antagonistic struggle 
between the people and the elite. In this way, society is polarized in 
two large antagonistic fields —although they also support the idea 
of a thin-centered ideology of Mudde and Kaltwasser, they highlight 
the role of that ideology in the discursive construction of a political 
reality—. Laclau (Laclau), instead, proposes that this phenomenon is 
manifested as a political logic, as a way of constructing the political, of 
forming the collective identities, that is, the formation of the people as 
a political-historical actor although it emphasizes the transcendental 
role that fulfills the political speech in the construction of the collec-
tive identities.
On the other side, authors such as Mudde (Mudde); Stanley (Stan-
ley); Zanatta (2014); Rovira Kaltwasser and Hawkins (Hawkins & Ro-
vira Kaltwasser); see populism as an ideological phenomenon focused 
on a set of ideas characterized by an antagonism between people and 
elite, where the former holds sovereignty and the latter corruption. In 
their perspective, populism needs thick ideologies such as liberalism 
or socialism to make sense of their government programs. This is the 
reason why right-wing or left-wing populism can exist.
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 
2017) argue that it is feasible to create a “definition that is able to ac-
curately capture the core of all major past and present manifestations 
of populism, while still precise enough to exclude clearly non-populist 
phenomena”. In recent decades, a number of social scientists have 
chosen to define populism as an “ideational approach” by conceiving 
it as a discourse, an ideology or a way of conceiving the world. Far 
from reaching a consensus on the precise definition of the populist 
phenomenon (especially in language and peripheral elements), the 
“ideational approach” managed to share a number of key elements 
within the different definitions such as the reference to a “people” 
denouncing the existence of an “elite”. (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 
2017). 
Defining populism as a “thin-centered ideology” is useful in order 
to understand “the oft-alleged malleability of the concept in ques-
tion” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). The authors understand 
ideology as a set of normative ideas about the nature of man and so-
ciety as well as organizations and their objectives. In simple words, 
“it is a view of how the world is and should be” (Mudde & Rovira 
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Kaltwasser, 2017). Unlike “full ideologies” (socialism, liberalism and 
fascism among others), the authors said, “thin- centered ideology” 
like populism has a restricted morphology that, in most cases, must 
be accompanied by a “full ideology” that completes it and allows to 
promote concrete political projects. Therefore, “by itself populism 
can offer neither complex nor comprehensive answers to the political 
questions that modern societies generate”(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwas-
ser, 2017).
According to the authors, this way of defining populism allows it 
to take different forms that are consistent in the way the key elements 
of populism appear to relate to other concepts, “forming interpreta-
tive frames that might be more or less appealing to different societies” 
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). 
The plurality of definitions on populism gives an idea of the exten-
sion and density of a phenomenon that affects all the activities of a 
State. Within these activities that of foreign policy is crucial to pin-
point. For instance, Verbeek and Zaslove (Verbeek & Zaslove) refer 
to foreign policy as a fairly common, though much-debated, concept. 
They understand foreign policy generally as “the intentions and ac-
tions of an actor directed at the actor’s external world” (Verbeek 
& Zaslove, 2017). In most cases, the actor refers to sovereign states 
(Neack, 2008). They are also aware that nowadays the concept of tra-
ditional foreign policy (focused only on the external actions of the 
state) generates a series of theoretical difficulties. In particular, be-
cause a succession of new non-state, sub-national and supranational 
actors have emerged who would be able to exercise or apply a foreign 
policy, that is, a set of actions aimed at pursuing their interests at the 
global level.
In this case, and to make it clear from the beginning, it is under-
stood that foreign policy is exclusive to sovereign states and only they 
can conduct it through diplomacy. Colacrai and Lechini (Colacrai & 
Lechini, 1994) define foreign policy as “a public policy that encom-
passes the set of decisions and actions taken by the rulers of a nation-
state to operate in the international system, in response to internal 
and external demands and determinants”. It is implemented through 
a programme that has a dual function: on the one hand, to fulfil the 
aims or goals proposed and, on the other, to solve the problems that 
arise in the international sphere, whether they are new or have been 
caused by previous administrations.
The advance towards the theory of foreign policy was given by the 
approach of neoclassical realism. This “emerging school of foreign 
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policy theory” (Lobell et al., 2009) as some authors call it “interlink 
the structural-systemic qualities of realism with a specialized ap-
proach to the elite decision-makers, the FPE - Foreign Policy Execu-
tive” (Monroy Hernández, 2014). As we mentioned earlier, foreign 
policy is composed of internal and external variables. 
With the study of domestic factors, i.e. “ideological differences, 
internal political pressures or the psychology of the leader” (Rose, 
1998), researchers, in the fields of foreign policy studies, are trying 
to establish the extent to which they can influence or impact foreign 
policy. External factors are determined by the international system, 
which is made up of a set of state and non-state actors competing with 
each other in the pursuit of their own interests. This competition can 
be a condition or an opportunity for a state depending on its foreign 
policy objective, its material and resource mobilization capacities.
Returning to the domestic variables, it is important to highlight the 
role of the human factor which is the one that makes the decisions in 
matters of foreign policy. In this respect, it is pertinent to point out 
that this idea of the human factor emanates from “an anthropology of 
International Relations, which places man at the centre of the study 
of this discipline and of foreign policy, whether acting alone or in a 
group” (Monroy Hernández, 2014). 
According to Alexander George (George, 1991), the political 
behaviour of the executive power holder will depend on his cogni-
tive beliefs, that is, his ideology, vision of the world and beliefs about 
political strategies and tactics, which he has acquired throughout his 
personal and political life. Colacrai and Lechini express a similar idea, 
arguing that, in the Argentine case, especially during the government 
of Carlos Menem (1989-1999), “the decision-making process was con-
centrated in the figure of the President of the Nation and the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, who were the ultimate decision-making unit” (Co-
lacrai & Lechini, 1994). Therefore, we believe there is a link between 
populism understood as ideology (thin-centered) and foreign policy. 
What’s Kirchnerism and why they were populists?
We discuss its development in the analysis of the three adminis-
trations of the Kirchners, first Nestor and then Cristina (2003-2015). 
Kirchnerism’s followers argue that it successfully boosted the country 
from its worst crisis (Weyland) to set into motion a virtuous model of 
growth and social inclusion. Its adversaries, instead, consider the pe-
riod as a populist backslide characterized by economic mishandling, 
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widespread corruption and presidential authoritarianism (Gervasoni 
& Peruzzotti, 2015). 
In this sense, Erdem Aytaç and Ziya Öniş (Aytaç & Öniş) argue that 
Kirchnerism, in addition to being a political movement, was populist 
and use Barr’s categories (leadership by an outsider or a maverick, 
heavy use of anti-establishment appeals, and emphasis on plebiscitary 
linkages) to support their claims. Beyond the differences in terms of 
what populism is - a thin-centered ideology, a political strategy, style 
or political discourse - all authors agree on certain characteristics 
common to the different populist governments as outlined by Barr. 
The authors continue to highlight the elements that allow them to 
affirm that the Kirchners’ government was populist. So, they argue 
that, although Néstor Kirchner’s candidacy during the 2003 presiden-
tial elections was backed by the Peronist interim president Eduardo 
Duhalde, as governor of a small Patagonian province he was little 
known to the public (Aytaç & Öniş, 2014). 
Secondly, the fact that they presented themselves as outside the 
Peronist establishment allowed them to credibly use anti-establish-
ment appeals, which they employed extensively.
Néstor Kirchner tried to establish himself as the leader of “el 
pueblo argentino” (“the Argentine people”) and articulated a dis-
course contrasting “the people” and “its enemies” who were embod-
ied by, among others, Menemismo, the IMF, international creditors 
of the Argentine debt, the multinational oil corporations, and the 
mainstream media. Cristina Kirchner closely followed this discourse; 
during the conflict between her government and the agricultural sec-
tor in 2008 following her decision to raise export taxes, she accused 
the dissident farmers of “a hidden coup attempt” (“se esconde un 
intento golpista”) accompanied by some media “gen-rals” (“acompa-
ñados por algunos ‘generales’ multimediáticos”). In turn, she pleaded 
that she “needed the strength of the Argentine people” (“necesito la 
fuerza del pueblo argentino”) to “defend Argentina” (“defender a la 
Argentina”). (Aytaç & Öniş, 2014).
Finally, the authors highlight the fact that both presidents em-
phasized plebiscitary links between the people and the ruler, as 
they greatly increased executive power at the expense of other in-
stitutions. Levisky and Murillo (Levitsky & Murillo) point out that 
Néstor Kirchner “governed at the margins of Congress and other 
institutions of horizontal accountability” and interfered with judi-
cial independence:
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As an indicator of executive power concentration, Néstor Kirchner signed 
a total of 270 decrees of necessity and urgency (DNU), in effect assuming 
powers which belong to the Congress. With an average of sixty DNUs 
per year, he remains the Argentine president who used this prerogative 
most frequently. Both Néstor and Cristina Kirchner rarely talked to re-
porters or gave press conferences during their tenures; Cristina Kirchner 
closed her presidential campaign of 2011 without giving a single interview 
and was reported not to hold cabinet meetings anymore. (Aytaç & Öniş, 
2014).
Some might ask why they did not mainly make an analysis of 
Kirchnerism as an Ideational Approach. The answer is very simple, 
but crucial to mention: it is not necessary to do so to fulfill our goal. 
Indeed, we are only interested in demonstrating that Kirchnerism is 
considered populist by most authors and what’s better than quot-
ing authors from other latitudes who use another author as Barr 
to conceptualize Kirchnerism as populist. On the other hand, the 
Ideational Approach, far from opposing other definitions, seeks to 
reach a minimum consensus on what populism is, and those “mini-
mum elements” are present in Barr’s conceptualization. Let’s put 
it this way, what at first would seem to be a contradiction, ends up 
making sense under a different logic. 
As Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwas-
ser) said, “The political-strategic definition is not necessarily opposed 
to a consideration of ideas and rhetoric (Barr 2009; Levitsky and Lox-
ton 2013), but it tends to see the discourse of populists as less impor-
tant predictors of their behavior” (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser). 
Foreign Policy Analysis of Kirchnerism
Néstor Kirchner
Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) assumed the presidency of the Re-
public on May 25, 2003 in a context of “certain” political, social and 
economic stability but with urgent problems to solve such as econom-
ic reactivation, reduction of poverty, social exclusion and foreign debt 
—the year before Argentina, under the interim presidency of Adolfo 
Rodríguez Saá, had declared itself in default—. 
Throughout his mandate, there were a number of phrases that re-
mained very present during his official speeches (11 spoke specifically 
of foreign policy) such as Argentine People; By Popular Mandate, 
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Historical Understanding and Political Decision1; National Capital-
ism; Rich Countries vs. Poor Countries2; Poverty, Social Exclusion 
and Unemployment3; Foreign Policy Oriented to the Defense of the 
Legitimate Interests of the Argentine People4; National Autonomy 
and People’s Sovereignty5; Brother Towns; Reform of the Multilat-
eral Credit Organizations; IMF; The foreign debt will not be paid at 
the expense of the hunger of the Argentineans6; International Co-re-
sponsibility7; Mercosur as a space for integration and regional unity8; 
Prosperity for the few and misery for the many; Regional Solidarity9; 
Globalization as a generator of poverty and social exclusion10; Wash-
ington Consensus and the neoliberal model as the ones responsible 
for structural adjustment and foreign debt11.
We can resume his populist perspective in one phrase “By popular 
mandate, by historical understanding and by political decision, this is 
the opportunity for transformation, for the cultural and moral change 
that the hour demands. Change is the name of the future.” (Kirchner, 
May 25, 2003).
1. Discurso de asunción del Presidente Néstor Kirchner a la Asamblea Legislativa el 25 de mayo 
del 2003. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/discurso-de-asuncion-del-presidente-nes-
tor-kirchner-a-la- asamblea-legislativa-el-25-de-mayo-del-2003/ (1 march 2020).
2. Palabras de Néstor Kirchner en el cierre de la Cumbre de las Américas en Monterrey, 13 de 
enero de 2004. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/nestor-kirchner-en-la-cumbre-de-las-
americas-en- monterrey/ (1 march 2020).
3. Palabras del Presidente Néstor Kirchner en la 59° Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, 
el 21 de setiembre de 2004. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/nestor-kirchner-en-la-
59-asamblea-general- de-las-naciones-unidas/ (2 march 2020).
4. Discurso de Néstor Kirchner ante la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, 14 de setiem-
bre de 2005. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/nestor-kirchner-en-las-naciones-unidas-
en-2005/ (2 march 2020).
5. Palabras del Presidente Néstor Kirchner en la IV Cumbre de las Américas en el Auditorio del 
Hotel Provincial, Mar del Plata, 4 de noviembre de 2005. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.
com/nestor-kirchner-en-la-iv-cumbre-de-las-americas-en-mar-del-plata/ (3 march 2020).
6. Discurso del presidente Néstor Kirchner al anunciar el pago adelantado al FMI, 15 de diciem-
bre de 2005. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/discurso-del-presidente-nestor-kirch-
ner-al-anunciar-el-pago- adelantado-al-fmi-15-de-diciembre-de-2005/ (3 march 2020).
7. Discurso del Presidente Néstor Kirchner ante el Consejo de las Américas, New York, 22 de 
setiembre de 2004. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/nestor-kirchner-en-el-consejo-de-
las-americas-new-york- 2004/ (3 march 2020).
8. Discurso de Néstor Kirchner en la Cumbre del Mercosur en Ouro Preto, 17 de diciembre de 2004. 
Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/cumbre-del-mercosur-en-ouro-preto/ (4 march 2020).
9. Palabras del presidente de la Nación Néstor Kirchner en la Asamblea Nacional de la República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela, 6 de julio de 2006. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/nestor-
kirchner-en-la-asamblea-nacional-de-venezuela-2006/ (4 march 2020).
10. Palabras del Presidente Néstor Kirchner en la 58° Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas 
el 25 de septiembre de 2003. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/discurso-de-nestor-
kirchner-en-la-onu- 2003/ (4march 2020).
11. Discurso pronunciado por el presidente Néstor Kirchner ante la 61ra. Asamblea General 
de la Naciones Unidas, 2006. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/nestor-kirchner-en-la-
onu-2006/ (5 march 2020).
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A careful analysis of the postulates of Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser 
and Hawkins about populism as an “Ideational Approach” shows 
what the government of Néstor Kirchner thought of the world. First, 
there was clear mention of the Argentine people as the only sover-
eign (people as sovereign) expressing their “general will” through the 
popular mandate. On the other hand, the people were seen as victims 
of the multilateral credit organizations, composed of the IMF and pri-
vate banks, which together with the local petty bourgeoisie were part 
of the global financial elite that operated for years against the interests 
of the people in a very favorable context of globalization, in order to 
impose the prosperity of a few and the misery of the majority.
At the international-political level, the reasoning followed these 
same lines, a marked difference between the “rich countries” (THEY) 
of the north (with the US as their main promoter and beneficiary) 
established the international rules of the game that notably harmed 
the “poor countries” (WE) of the south (Argentina among others). 
The consolidation maneuvers were manifested by the imposition of 
the neoliberal model “agreed upon” in the Washington Consensus of 
structural adjustment and foreign debt of the countries of the South, 
together with a policy of exporting agricultural subsidies/grants for 
the economies of the North. This is the Manichean mind map with 
which Néstor designed his populist foreign policy that had internal 
and external variables as the foreign policy authors theorized.
Its foreign policy had main structuring axes, like MERCOSUR, 
a space of integration and regional unity; the UN reform to end the 
privileges of the Security Council and include the issues of social and 
economic development like poverty reduction; the reform of the inter-
national financial system through the IMF so that it take into account 
distributive equity, poverty and employment; the reinforcement of the 
links with the brother countries, especially Brazil and Venezuela; the 
negotiation of the foreign debt under the banner of co-responsibility 
and the failure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) led 
and financed by the US.
In this sense, Néstor Kirchner’s foreign policy strengthened the 
relationship with politically related countries through MERCOSUR 
(Simonoff, 2010), promoting the entry of Bolivia and Venezuela as 
full members of the regional organization, intensified his relations 
with Lula Da Silva’s Brazil, included Argentina in UNASUR (Mi-
randa, 2004). Despite believing that priority should be given to the 
institutional strengthening of MERCOSUR, diversified foreign trade 
and integrated it into the national productive matrix. He distanced 
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himself from the Americans (Tokatlian, 2008) and renegotiated the 
foreign debt as well as fought for fairer international trade by prevent-
ing the US and the EU from concluding an agreement on agricultural 
subsidies for the Cancun Summit in September 2003. He managed 
to sink the FTAA project during the 2004 summit in Mar del Plata, 
Argentina, with the excuse that it would not benefit the countries of 
the region and would only accentuate the trade gaps between Latin 
America and the U.S. 
In other words, he imbued his foreign policy with a populist vision 
that allowed him to regain room for maneuver in order to restore to 
the Argentine people their dignity as sovereigns and better economic 
conditions as ordinary people.
In relation to the 4 categories identified by Destradi and Plage-
man (Destradi & Plagemann) we argue that the government of Néstor 
Kirchner did not seek a more conflict-prone bilateral relations with 
the central countries (USA and EU) mainly because it needed their 
help to negotiate the foreign debt: it was a conflict-prone relation-
ship from the discourse but friendly from the practice. However, with 
multilateral credit agencies such as the IMF did not happen the same, 
with which he tightened his ties to the point of settling the debt with 
the organization and breaking relations. 
In relation to the attempt at a weakening of global governance and 
its institutions, he weakened and broke with international financial 
bodies. He was deliberately seeking to gain a position in this area in 
order to obtain greater room for maneuver in the negotiation of the 
foreign debt and to put an end to the recurring problem of Argen-
tina’s default, due to the irresponsibility of governments and the inter-
national financial system. But he was not trying to weaken the United 
Nations system, for example; on the contrary, he made it stronger by 
providing it with more bureaucratic instruments and greater capac-
ity for action through the modification of the Security Council. His 
populist policy was evident into modify the international institutional 
structure but not in his endeavor to weaken it.
Undoubtedly, his foreign policy was a more centralized and per-
sonalized foreign policy where the design and even the implemen-
tation of policies were done from the presidency and the foreign 
minister, without taking into account the diplomatic bureaucracy or 
the country’s foreign tradition. Even the national media12 spoke of an 
12. “La lista de embajadores que quiere jubilar Timerman”. Available at: https://www.lapolitica-
online.com/nota/nota-67663/ (5 march 2020).
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attempt to make entry to the diplomatic career more flexible through 
the Institute of the Foreign Service, to allow the entry of personnel in 
line with the interests of the national government and thus overcome 
the bureaucratic obstacles, that certain career officials imposed on the 
president and his minister.
Definitely building up a new international partnership while weak-
ening the link to traditional western partners was very present not only 
with the strengthening of MERCOSUR as an institution of regional 
integration but also with the creation of the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) that came to fulfill the same functions that the 
Organization of American States (OAS) already had but without the 
presence of the USA. The idea was to design a regional integration 
system with a continental vocation that would unite the populist ide-
als of the majority of the member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bo-
livia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela) and begin to strengthen the 
economic, political and social ties of the “brothers countries”. It was 
a clear attempt to build a new system of regional alliances to weaken 
the previous one represented by the OAS.
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
On October 28, 2007, the official presidential formula Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-2015)-Julio Cobos triumphed with just 
over 45% of the votes, thus giving continuity to the project initiated 
in 2003 by Néstor Kirchner. In her opening speech13 to the Congress 
of the Republic, she spoke of globalization as a process that is con-
trary to the interests of the nation since the economic and social de-
velopment of a country is achieved through the unrestricted defense 
of national interests. the populist notion of national and international 
political reality is linked to the idea of domestic and external variables 
were into account on the designer of foreign relations.
It then goes on to reaffirm the idea of a collective political project, 
which includes the people and is contrary to the liberal claims of so-
cial, political and economic individuality. 
I have never believed in personal and individual triumphs, I deeply dis-
believe in them, because I believe in collective constructions and society. 
This last October 28th precisely validated, ratified a different political, 
13. Mensaje de la Presidenta a la Asamblea Legislativa del Congreso de la Nación en su asunción 
del mando, 10 de diciembre de 2007. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/asuncion-de-
cristina- kirchner-10-de-diciembre-de-2007/ (5 march 2020).
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social and economic construction, we did it with all the Argentines (Fer-
nández, December 10, 2007).
This inaugurated a period characterized by a high level of politi-
cal confrontation that led Cristina’s government to defy directly the 
national media and the countryside (agro-industrial sector) where 
both would go on to constitute the local ELITE which was identi-
fied with the concentration of political and economic power in the 
country. At an external level, the confrontation took place against a 
group of international creditors, called “Vulture Funds”, who refused 
to be included in the renegotiation of the foreign debt and decided 
to threaten the national government in court for the payment of the 
bonds owed.
She continues to highlight the issue of debt relief with the IMF 
and the need to continue with an economic development model with 
reasonable autonomy “in a globalized world”. Two key aspects during 
the previous presidency, and which also seem to be so for President 
Cristina. She shows her Manichean vision of the international reality 
by leaning on the External Villain14, the International Monetary Fund, 
and adding another, already known, globalization. Although the latter 
is not a global institution, a country or a group of agents that possess 
economic power, but rather a process that allowed the consolidation 
of the neoliberal system and its brutal concentration of world wealth 
and therefore of the increase in inequality, the president will treat it as 
if it were. Always associating it with the External Villain.
In other words, globalization as such is part of the evils to be eradi-
cated in order to give back to the People their condition of sovereign-
ty, understood as the expression of the general will and of common 
people who lost their economic rights because of this process.
Their idea of inserting themselves into the world would be through 
regional organizations such as MERCOSUR and the recently created 
UNASUR (Union of South American Nations), which was intended 
to function as a space for dialogue on the problems and challenges 
they shared as a region, but also served as a place for populist con-
solidation. In particular among the governments of Argentina, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela that took advantage of the ideologi-
cal closeness to join efforts in the national, regional and international 
14. It is that international agent that seeks the domination and conquest of the people under-
stood in sovereign terms, in: Maria E. Casullo, Por qué funciona el populismo? El discurso que 
sabe construir explicaciones convincentes de un mundo en crisis (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores 
Argentina, 2019).
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strengthening of their administrations. In the literature15 were known as 
the “Left-Wing Populisms; Left Populisms or Inclusionary Populisms”.
Cristina had a concept of people as a Nation (homeland)16 rath-
er than as ordinary people. Although both conceptions are present 
throughout the speeches of both leaders, the truth is that one con-
ception always prevails over the other. For instance, Néstor had a vi-
sion of the People more oriented to the Common People and Cristina 
more similar to the Nation (homeland). This was particularly evident 
in her foreign policy, which permanently sought to guarantee national 
autonomy by strengthening links with emerging global actors such as 
Russia and China, which were hailed as states that respected popular 
sovereignty and sought to do productive business for the Argentine 
people. And, at the regional level, the same was done with MERCO-
SUR and UNASUR along with the relationship of brotherhood with 
Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
The themes that marked her 8 years of government, according to 
theirs more than 23 speeches that speak about foreign relations, were; 
Regional integration as a barrier to external threats17; Reform of multi-
lateral credit organizations18; Shared responsibility between central and 
peripheral nations19; UN reform that privileges a few20; Food security 
15. Y. Stavrakakis, A. Kioupkiolis, G. Katsambekis, N. Nikisianis, & T. Siomos, ‘Contempo-
rary Left-wing Populism in Latin America: Leadership, Horizontalism, and Postdemocracy in 
Chávez’s Venezuela’, Latin American Politics and Society, 58(3), 2016, pp. 51-76. Doi:10.1111/
j.1548-2456.2016.00318.x 
16. Mensaje de la Presidenta a la Asamblea Legislativa del Congreso de la Nación en su asunción 
del mando, 10 de diciembre de 2007. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/asuncion-de-
cristina-kirchner-10-de-diciembre-de-2007/ (6 march 2020).
17. Discurso de la presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner en el acto de apertura de la xxxv 
Cumbre del Mercosur, Tucumán 01 de julio de 2008. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/
discurso-de-cristina- en-la-cumbre-del-mercosur-2008/ (6 march 2020).
18. Mensaje de la presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner a la Asamblea General de las Nacio-
nes Unidas, Nueva York 23 de septiembre de 2008. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/
mensaje-de-cristina-a- la-asamblea-general-de-la-onu-2008/ (7 march 2020).
19. Mensaje de la Presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner en la Asamblea General de la 
Organización de las Naciones Unidas. 24 de septiembre de 2010. Nueva York. Available at: 
https://www.cfkargentina.com/cfk-en-la-onu-mensaje-en-la-asamblea-general-de-2010/ (7 march 
2020).
20. Discurso de la presidenta de la nación, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, en la 66a Asamblea 
General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, en Nueva York. Miércoles, 21 de Septiembre 
de 2011. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/discurso-de-cristina-kirchner-66a-asamblea-
general-de-la-organizacion- de-las-naciones-unidas/ (9 march 2020).
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of central countries21; Vulture funds22; Popular mandate23; Neoliberal 
policies and financial globalization as responsible for the deindustrial-
ization of peripheral countries24; Environmental liabilities of developing 
countries25; The World (Wehner & Thies) vs Investment Funds (Vul-
ture Funds)26; Regional Unity (Mercosur, Unasur, Celac)27; Democracy 
as an exercise of the popular will28; Risk Rating as Defenders of Invest-
ment Funds’ Interests29; The Need to Create a New World Order30; 
Paying to Vulture Funds would be to condemn the whole people to 
poverty31; UN General Assembly as the true sovereign of global de-
mocracy32; The Suffering History of our Peoples33; Regional Income 
21. Foro del sector empresario de la cumbre del G-20. 03 de noviembre de 2011. Cannes, Francia. 
Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/discurso-de-cristina-en-la-cumbre-del-g-20-2011-en-
cannes/ (9 march 2020).
22. Mensaje de la Presidenta a la Asamblea Legislativa del Congreso de la Nación en su asunción 
del mando, 10 de diciembre de 2011. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/asuncion-de-
cristina- kirchner-10-de-diciembre-de-2011/ (9 march 2020).
23. Ídem. Mensaje de la Presidenta a la Asamblea Legislativa del Congreso de la Nación en su 
asunción del mando, 10 de diciembre de 2011. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/asun-
cion-de-cristina- kirchner-10-de-diciembre-de-2011/ (9 march 2020).
24. Discurso de la presidenta cristina fernandez de kirchner en la 67°asamblea general de naciones 
unidas 2012. Available at: https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/archivo/26102-67a-asam-
blea-general-de-las-naciones-unidas-discurso-de-la-presidenta-de-la-nacion (10 march 2020).
25. Discurso de CFK en la Cumbre de Energía 2013 en Abu Dhabi. Martes 15 de Enero de 2013. 
Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/cumbre-mundial-de-energia-2013-en-abu-dhabi/ (10 
march 2020).
26. Quiero referirme a lo que ha sucedido hace unos días en Nueva York. Available at: https://www.
cfkargentina.com/la-audiencia-con-los-fondos-buitres-en-ny-y-el-pago-de-la-deuda/ (13 march 2020).
27. Palabras de CFK en la cena en honor de la Presidenta de la República Federativa del Brasil 
Dilma Rousseff y su comitiva en el Museo del Bicentenario. Jueves, 25 de Abril de 2013. Available 
at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/cristina-ofrecio-una-cena-de-honor-a-dilma-rousseff-y-su-co-
mitiva/ (13 march 2020).
28. Palabras de CFK, en la clausura del XXIII Período Ordinario de Sesiones de la Conferencia 
General para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en América Latina y el Caribe (OPANAL). 
Jueves, 22 de Agosto de 2013. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/cristina-cerro-la-con-
ferencia-general-del-organismo-para- la-proscripcion-de-las-armas-nucleares-en-america-latina-y-
el-caribe-opanal/ (14 march 2020).
29. Palabras de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner en la 68a Asamblea General de la Organización 
de las Naciones Unidas, Nueva York. 24 de septiembre de 2013. Available at: https://www.cfkar-
gentina.com/cristina-68-asamblea-onu/ (14 march 2020).
30. Cristina en la cumbre G77+China «Hacia un nuevo orden mundial para vivir bien», en Santa 
Cruz de la Sierra, Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. 15 de junio de 2014. Available at: https://www.
cfkargentina.com/g77china-hacia-un-nuevo-orden-mundial-para-vivir-bien/ (14 march 2020).
31. Palabras de la Presidenta Cristina Kirchner en la cumbre BRICS con UNASUR en Brasilia, 
16 de julio de 2014. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/cristina-kirchner-cumbre-brics-
unasur-fondos-buitres/ (15 march 2020).
32. Palabras de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner ante la 69a Asamblea General de las Naciones 
Unidas. Nueva York, 24 de septiembre de 2014. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/
cristina-kirchner-69- asamblea-onu/ (15 march 2020).
33. Inauguramos la nueva sede Néstor Kirchner de Unasur, en el Centro del Mundo, en Quito. 
Viernes, 05 de Diciembre de 2014. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/inauguramos-la-
nueva-sede-nestor- kirchner-de-unasur-en-el-centro-del-mundo-en-quito/ (16 march 2020).
42 Cultura Latinoam. Volumen 34, número 2, julio-diciembre 2021, pp. 24-47
RODOLFO COLALONGO - STELLAMARINA DONATO
Distribution and Citizen Equality34; Hegemonic positions35; Global 
distributive inequality36.
At the BRICS-UNASUR Summit held in Brasilia in July 2014, the 
BRICS summed up its foreign policy in a populist key: “The call to 
all countries is to join forces in this true crusade for a new global or-
ganization in political, economic and financial matters that will have 
positive social, political and cultural consequences for our peoples”. 
There was a clear idea of consolidating populism by uniting with oth-
er governments of similar political hues in order to continually sustain 
the defense of the rights of the people. Carlos de la Torre (de la Torre)
made a similar argument when he analyzed Venezuela’s role within 
ALBA.
The government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner deepened the 
foreign policy that began with her predecessor, Néstor Kirchner. It 
not only continued with its populist conception through a markedly 
dualistic vision of international reality represented by poor countries 
vs. rich ones, but also by identifying a global financial elite that op-
erated against the interests of the people as a nation, undermining 
sovereignty and subjecting them to policies of misery and inequality 
in order to collect their debts. Figures such as vulture funds, the IMF 
and the world banks were used to name the global elite with the sup-
port of the US government. On the other hand, the figure of poor and 
rich states (us/them) served to justify their new international alliances 
in order to obtain greater national autonomy.
However, its differentiation from the previous government in 
foreign affairs was in two matters. The first was that it had a clear 
vocation to modify the global governance and its institutions rather 
than weakening. It is evident that it was concerned with global is-
sues such as climate change, terrorism, international trade, and peace 
and security, but not from the traditional institutional spaces, the 
UN, the WTO or the Security Council, but by strengthening interna-
tional forums such as the G-20 and G-77, which served as spaces for 
more democratic and pluralistic discussion. They were also used to 
34. Cristina en la 47 Cumbre de Jefes y Jefas de Estado del Mercosur, en Paraná, Entre Ríos, 17 
de diciembre de 2014. Available at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/cristina-en-la-47-cumbre-del-
mercosur-en- parana-entre-rios/ (17 march 2020).
35. Discurso de la Presidenta en el Plenario de la 48o Cumbre de Mercosur en Brasilia. Avail-
able at: https://www.cfkargentina.com/plenario-de-la-48o-cumbre-de-mercosur-en-brasilia/ (17 
march 2020).
36. Palabras de la Presidenta de la Nación, Dra. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, ante la 70° 
Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, 28 de septiembre de 2015. Available at: https://www.
cfkargentina.com/discurso-de-cristina-kirchner-en-la-70-asamblea-general-de-naciones-unidas- 
onu/ (18 march 2020).
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strengthen links with China and Russia. Clear competitors of the US 
in the international system.
The other aspect has to do with the “building up a new interna-
tional partnership while weakening links to traditional western part-
ners which became a regional foreign priority”. To strengthen the 
links with the brother countries of the region but through UNASUR 
and MERCOSUR as the fundamental pillars of South American inte-
gration leaving aside others like the OAS or the Summit of the Ameri-
cas. UNASUR had a short but intense life with large regional projects 
in the making. Although it continued to cultivate its bilateral relations 
with countries such as Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay 
and Venezuela. All, except Uruguay, are considered left-wing populist 
governments.
Conclusions 
This paper argues that peculiarities in populist foreign policy 
were present at the times of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner. More 
specifically, through their declarations during relevant speeches at 
international stages it noticed that by enduring a sort of Manichean 
division of the world into good and bad categories, as in the people 
vs the elite, and poor vs rich countries; dramatic foreign policy con-
sequences were developed. 
Thanks to this theoretical background and our case study, we have 
observed that populist foreign policy during Kirchnerism in Argenti-
na has some interesting features to stress. For instance, our case study 
has shown how populist leaders with the clear intention of strengthen-
ing political-populist ties and sharing national experiences implement 
a process of international cooperation in their mandates and over-
come national policies by reinforcing or creating regional alliances in 
contraposition to former wester ones. Moreover, internal and external 
variables were taken into account when designing the populist foreign 
policy, as the author of foreign policy points out (Colacrai & Lechini, 
1994). In addition, in the analyzed speeches of the two leaders it is 
clear a reaction to the dynamics of globalization. Indeed, in the words 
of both presidents, globalization has undermined popular sovereignty 
at the expense of Argentine national autonomy, and it has also seri-
ously damaged the national economic development of the country. 
Therefore, the culprit is the western imprinting or influence. De-
spite that the criticism of globalization is clear in the words of both 
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Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, we argue that their populist govern-
ments design foreign policies capable of embracing populist strings 
even beyond domestic politics. Indeed, they are trying to modify the 
traditional international system creating another one which is closer to 
their national interests (popular sovereignty, national autonomy and 
national economic development) and reinforces the relationship with 
other similar populist governments, preferably in the same region. 
Despite the limits of our study, in terms of the time span analyzed 
and the case study, as we have discussed throughout the paper, our 
conclusions might suggest an explanatory model which could help 
to better understand the populist foreign policy during Kirchnerism 
in Argentina. Finally, our model, as in Fig. 1, could be used in other 
studies that research foreign policy in other left-wing populists’ power 
and regimes, especially in the Latin American region suggesting fur-
ther studies on the topic.
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